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This paper examines the effect of monetary policy on the market value of the liquidity services
that financial assets provide, known as the liquidity premium. Money supply and nominal
interest rates have positive effects on the liquidity premium, but asset supply has a negative
effect. This implies that liquid financial assets are substantive substitutes for money, and that
the opportunity cost of holding money plays a key role in explaining variation in the liquidity
premium and thus in asset prices. The higher cost of holding money due to higher money
growth rates leads to the higher liquidity premium of liquid assets. My empirical analysis with
U.S. Treasury data over the period from 1946 to 2008 confirms the theoretical predictions. The
theory also suggests that the liquidity properties of assets can cause negative nominal yields
in equilibrium when the cost of holding money is low and liquid assets are scarce. I present
empirical findings in the U.S. and Switzerland to support this prediction.
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1 Introduction
Investors value financial assets not only for their intrinsic value of the expected dividend stream
but also for their liquidity: the ability to help facilitating transactions. For instance, U.S. Trea-
suries are often used as collateral in a secured credit market through repurchase agreements,
are easily sold for cash in secondary asset markets, and sometimes are even used directly as
means of payment. Accordingly, many liquid financial assets are priced above their respective
fundamental value: their prices are higher than those of illiquid assets with comparable safety
and maturity characteristics. This means that liquid assets bear liquidity premia. In fact, it is
well known that the liquidity premia account for a large part of the variation in the liquid asset
prices observed in financial markets.1
The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of monetary policy on liquidity premia
and to explore a liquidity-based explanation for the negative bond yields that have been re-
cently observed in some countries. This analysis is important for investigating the effects of the
various monetary policies of the central bank. This includes openmarket operations, which aim
to affect the supplies of money and bonds that circulate in the economy and, thus, to control
short term interest rates, as well as unconventional monetary policy, which also directly affects
the quantity of liquid assets traded in financial markets. In addition, negative nominal yields
have never been observed until recently. As a result, our understanding of this phenomenon is
limited at best. The present paper offers a theory that can help rationalize this puzzling obser-
vation.
Since the goal of the paper is to study the liquidity premia of assets other than fiat money,
but also the effect of monetary policy on these premia, I build on the monetary search model
of Lagos and Wright (2005), but I extend the baseline framework in order to allow assets to
also have certain liquidity properties. This framework is not only tractable, but also allows me
to model financial assets as objects that compete with fiat money as facilitators of exchange.
Hence, in equilibrium, asset prices will include liquidity premia, because assets are effectively
substitutes to money, and changes in monetary policy, which affect the opportunity cost of
holding money, will also affect these premia.2 The model allows me to ask a number of impor-
tant questions, such as: How do the liquidity properties of assets (other than fiat money) affect
their prices and will these prices include liquidity premia? How do changes in the money and
bond supplies affect these liquidity premia? Can the liquidity properties of bonds explain the
negative yields recently observed?
Specifically, I extend the baseline framework of Lagos and Wright (2005) by including a
1 See Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006) for details.
2 In a recent survey paper, titled “Micro-foundations of Money: Why they Matter”, Waller (2015) identifies
endogenous asset liquidity as the first in a series of valuable lessons that macroeconomists have learned from the
recent monetary-search literature.
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risk-free government bond in addition to fiat money. The government bond as well as money
facilitate transactions in a goods market characterized by frictions such as anonymity and lim-
ited commitment. In equilibrium, the price of the bond will bear a liquidity premium which
agents are willing to pay for the bond’s ability to help them carry out transactions in the fric-
tional goods market. Accordingly, not only bond supply but also money supply affect the
bond’s liquidity premium and thereby its price. Importantly, the key concept that links money
supply and the liquidity premium is the opportunity cost of holding money. An increase in the
money growth rate increases the inflation rate under fully flexible prices. This implies higher
nominal interest rates through the Fisher effect, and thus the higher cost of holding money.3
Then, agents substitute more costly fiat money with liquid bonds because they are also useful
in the exchange process, which, in turn, leads to greater demand, higher liquidity premia and,
ultimately, higher bond prices (lower bond yields). As a result, the money growth rate has a
positive influence on the liquidity premia.
In the empirical exercise, I test the primary results of themodel, more precisely, the facts that
money supply has a positive effect on liquidity premia, whereas bond supply has a negative
effect on them. I document these facts by showing that changes in the growth rate of Narrow
Money4 have a significantly positive effect on a variety of yield spreads, and that changes in
Treasury supply have a negative effect. I use U.S. Treasuries as a proxy for the liquid bonds
introduced in the model, and and measure the liquidity premia on these bonds by the yield
spreads between the Treasuries and financial assets with different (lower) liquidity but sim-
ilar characteristics. The examples include the spread of AAA-rated corporate bonds against
the long term Treasury bonds, the TED spread, and the spreads of AA-rated Commercial Pa-
pers and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured Certificates of deposits against
Treasury bills.5 These financial assets are comparably safe but not as liquid as the Treasuries of
similar maturities; therefore one can reasonably argue that the spreads between the yields on
these assets and the Treasuries of similar maturities reflect differences in liquidity premia. In
addition, a monetary aggregate, Narrow Money, is used as a proxy of money because it only
includes components that can be used as a direct medium of exchange implied by the theory
unlike other broader monetary aggregates such as M1 and M2. Furthermore, the demand for
Narrow Money has a stable and negative relationship with its holding cost, or nominal inter-
3A one-time injection of money into the economy or a change in the level of money supply does not affect the
liquidity premium and any other real variables in the model, but the money growth rate does. Hence, money is
neutral but not superneutral here. However, unlike money, a one-time injection of bonds has a substantial impact
on real variables in the model.
4NarrowMoney includes nonbank public currency used as a medium of exchange, deposits held at Federal Re-
serves Banks, and reserve adjustment magnitude, which is“adjustments made to the monetary base due to changes
in the statutory reserve requirements”. See http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/09/0309ra.xls
for more details.
5 I use the yearly measures which Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) use in their paper for compari-
son as well as an additional measure such as the TED spread. In addition, the quarterly data are considered here
to increase the sample size of the measures.
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est rates over the sample period as required by the theory. The empirical tests with these data
confirm the positive effect of the money growth rate on the liquidity premia and the negative
effect of bond supply. Importantly, a one percentage point rise in the growth rate of Narrow
Money causes an increase of around 1.2 bps 2.4 bps in the liquidity premia of 3 month and 6
month Treasury bills, respectively. This implies that the Treasuries are substantive substitutes
for money, and that the opportunity cost of holding money plays a key role in explaining vari-
ation in the liquidity premium and thus in asset prices.
My model also suggests that negative nominal bond yields can arise as an equilibrium phe-
nomenon under certain conditions. I demonstrate that the liquidity properties of bonds can
lead to negative yields when there exist transactions where bonds are used as a medium of ex-
change through repurchase agreement contracts, but money would not be used. In particular,
when the opportunity costs of holding money (or short term interest rates) are low and bond
supply is scarce, the extra liquidity service benefits from bonds are highly valued, and thereby
the probability of negative yields due to the liquidity properties increases. Interestingly, Under
these circumstances, the negative yields of liquid bonds can emerge even though the short term
interest rates are low but positive, or there exist other illiquid assets with nonnegative yields.
The empirical findings in Switzerland and the United States support this theoretical result.
Similarly, there exist strong demand for Swiss and American government bonds (rather than
the Swiss Franc and the US dollar) outside of those countries unlike other countries’ govern-
ment bonds, because they are highly liquid in international financial markets. In Switzerland,
we have observed the negative Treasury yields over the several years since 2008. In fact, a
huge decline in the supply of liquid government bonds was markedly observed in Switzer-
land around the period of the financial crisis, starting in the last quarter of 2008 and then it has
remained historically low until 2015. Moreover, short term nominal interest rates were posi-
tive but close to zero during most years since 2008.6 According to the aforementioned theory
and empirical results, this observations strongly suggest that the liquidity of Swiss government
bonds were highly valued, and thereby that their high liquidity premia caused their negative
yields in Switzerland. Similar changes and negative Treasury yields were also observed in the
U.S. in September 2015. Notice that the existence of negative nominal yields is often considered
anomalous, because it is hard to reconcile through the lens of traditional monetary models.
However, my model of asset liquidity can help rationalize these observations.7
From the theoretic point of view, a large money search literature similarly shows that the
liquidity premium is a primary factor of variation in the prices of liquid financial assets, and
6The negative Treasury yields were observed in some European countries such as Germany, Italy and France,
but they emerged after the European Central Bank lowered its monetary policy target interest rate.
7One of the important lessons we’ve learned from asset liquidity is that it can shed light on existing asset-related
puzzles from a new perspective and provide a liquidity-based theory of asset pricing. Examples include Lagos
(2010a), Geromichalos, Herrenbrueck, and Salyer (2013), Geromichalos and Simonovska (2011), and Jung and Lee
(2015).
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that their supply is negatively correlated with the liquidity premium, but the money supply
is positively. Also, the key mechanism for this relationship is the opportunity cost of holding
money. As a pioneer theoretical paper, Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007) set up
a Lagos-Wright type of monetary search framework with a real asset, and theoretically show
that the money growth rate increases the liquidity premium in the economy where neither
money nor the asset are plentiful. They derive this result from the model where the asset is
a perfect substitute to money in transactions in a decentralized market, and money growth
leads to an increase in the opportunity cost of holding money. Also, several papers with this
substitution relationship between money and financial assets deliver similar results. Examples
include Rocheteau and Wright (2005a), Lagos (2010b), Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012),
Jacquet and Tan (2012), Williamson (2012), Carapella andWilliamson (2015), Geromichalos and
Herrenbrueck (2016), Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2016), and Geromichalos, Lee, Lee, and
Oikawa (2016). Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) calibrate a money search model to exam-
ine how money supply affects capital formation in a similar way. However, to the best of my
knowledge, the literature has not empirically tested the impact of money supply on the liquid-
ity premia, and has not investigated much how and under what conditions liquidity premia
can cause negative yields on liquid assets.
However, there are a few papers in the finance literature which study the bond supply effect
on the liquidity premium, and show that bond supply has a negative impact on the liquidity
premium. For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show a strong negative
relationship between the U.S. Treasury supply and its liquidity premium.8 Greenwood, Han-
son, and Stein (2015) show that the T-bill supply has a negative impact on its liquid premium.
Similarly, Longstaff (2004), Vayanos (2004), Brunnermeier (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2010) in-
vestigate liquidity premia, but focus on the short time periods such as financial crises. However,
they all set up the models without money; therefore, they do not study the effect of money sup-
ply on liquidity premia even if liquid bonds can partially play a role as substitutes with money.
As a result, the opportunity cost of holding money does not work to account for liquidity pre-
mia, either.
Nagel (2014) studies how this substitution relationship betweenmoney and liquid bonds af-
fects the liquidity premium through variation in the opportunity cost of holding money, which
is represented by the federal funds rate. The paper shows that the federal funds rate is posi-
tively correlated with the liquidity premium and that bond supply does not have a ‘persistent’
effect on the liquidity premium. This finding is in contrast with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012) and Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2015). It comes from the fact that changes
in the federal funds rate are involved with those in Treasury and money supplies at the same
8Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) define the convenience yield as the premia for both safety and
liquidity attributes of financial assets such as U.S. Treasuries, and present that the Treasury supply has a negative
effect on the convenience yield.
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time, because the open market operations by the Federal Reserve are implemented by buying
or selling of the Treasuries with money in the open market. Also, Nagel (2014) does not distin-
guish the effect of bond supply from that of money supply, and the effect of changes in money
growth from changes in the level of money supply. Importantly, however, my money search
model allows for separating these effects both theoretically and empirically.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a theoretic model to be tested
in Section 3. In Section 3, I provide a description of the data which are used in the empirical
work and test the results from the theory. In Section 4, I discuss negative yields on liquid bonds
with the theoretical and empirical results from the previous sections. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Physical Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a discount factor between periods, β ∈ (0, 1).
Each period is divided into two sub-periods. A decentralized market (henceforth DM) with
frictions opens in the first sub-period, and a perfectly competitive or centralized market (hence-
forth CM) follows. The frictions are characterized by anonymity among agents and bilateral
bargaining trade. As a result, unsecured credit is not allowed in transactions, and exchange
must be quid pro quo or needs secured credit. There are two divisible and nonstorable con-
sumption goods: goods produced and consumed in the CM (henceforth CM goods) and special
goods in the DM (henceforth DM goods). There are two types of agents; buyers and sellers,
whose measures are normalized to the unit, respectively. They live forever. Their identities are
determined by the roles which they play in the DM, and permanent. While sellers produce,
sell and do not consume DM goods, buyers consume and do not produce. Their preferences in
period t are given by
Buyers : U(xt, ht, qt) =u(qt) + U(xt)− ht
Sellers : V(xt, ht, qt) =− c(qt) + U(xt)− ht
where xt is consumption of CM goods, qt consumption of DM goods, ht hours worked to pro-
duce CM goods, and c(qt) a cost of production of qt. As in a standard model, U and u are
twice continuously differentiable with with U ′ > 0, u′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, u′′ < 0, u(0) = 0, u′(0) =
∞, u′(∞) = 0. Also, I assume that c(qt) = qt. Let q
∗ ≡ {q : u′(q) = 1}, i.e., it denotes the optimal
consumption level in the DM. Also, assume that there exists x∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that U ′(x∗) = 1
and U(x∗) > x∗.
There are two types of assets; fiat money and a 1-period real government bond. They are
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perfectly divisible and storable. Agents can purchase any amount of money and government
bonds at the ongoing price φt and ψt in the CM, respectively. Money grows at the rate of µ:
Mt+1 = (1+µ)Mt. I assume that µ > β−1, but also consider the limit case where µ→ β−1, i.e.,
the case where the money growth rate approaches closely the Friedman rule. If µ is positive, it
implies that new money is injected to buyers in the CM, but if µ negative, withdrawn through
lump-sump transfers. A government bond issued in period t delivers one unit of CM good in
period t + 1, and its supply in period t is At. Since I focus on stationarity equilibria, At is fixed
at A. The government (a consolidate authority) budget constraint is
Gt + Tt − φtµMt + A(1− ψt) = 0,
where Gt is government expenditure, Tt is a lump-sum transfer or tax, φtµMt is seigniorage of
new money injection, and A(1− ψt) is government debt service.
Now, I describe more details about activities which occur in each sub-period. First, I start
with the description of the second sub-period, where a CM opens. Both buyers and sellers
consume and produce a CM good. They work or use their assets, money (m) and government
bonds (a), which they are holding from the previous period in order to consume, and to pay
back the credit made in the previous period. Also, they trade money, and bonds among all
agents to re-balance their portfolio they will bring to the next period. They have access to
technology that turns one unit of labor into one unit of CM good.
Next, a DM opens in the first sub-period. All of buyers are matched with a seller in a
bilateral fashion and vice versa. Buyers make a take-it–or-leave-it (henceforth TIOLI) offer
to a seller to determine the terms of trade.9 Since buyers are anonymous and have limited
commitment, a medium of exchange (henceforth MOE) is required in their transactions. Both
money and government bonds can serve as media of exchange. Specifically, the DM is divided
into two sub-markets, DM1 and DM2, depending on what type of medium of exchange can be
used. In the DM1, sellers accept only a direct medium of exchange. Both assets are used as a
direct medium of exchange, but, unlike money, only a fraction g ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can serve as
a direct medium of exchange. g is an illiquidity parameter of government bonds, and reflects
the fact that the government bonds are not as liquid as money as a direct medium of exchange.
Intuitively, it implies that it can take time and cost for bonds to play a role as money do in
exchange in the DM1. On the other hand, in the DM2, sellers accept only collateralized credit
(or loans), i.e., secured credit as a MOE, and bonds are used as collateral for credit. The credit
is repaid back in CM goods in the forthcoming CM. Also, a portion h ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can only
be used as collateral; therefore, buyers always have incentives to pay back their credits. This
9I could assume that they negotiate the terms of trade through a Kalai bargaining protocol, where the buyers’
bargaining power is less than one. However, since the bargaining protocol is not critical to derive most of interest-
ing results of the paper, I use the simplest setup here by assuming that buyers make a TIOLI offer to their trading
partners.
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h is so-called the Loan to Value (henceforth LTV) ratio, and also is related to the haircut since
it is defined by 1 minus the LTV, following the standard approach in finance. All buyers and
sellers visit DM1 and DM2 with probabilities θ and 1 − θ, respectively. Figure 1 summarizes
the events within each period.
Figure 1: Market Timing
2.2 Value Functions
First, I describe the value function of a representative buyer who enters the CM with money
(m), bonds (a) and the collateralized credit (ℓ) made last period, since it is the buyer that makes
primary decisions for interesting results from the model. The value function of the buyer is
WB(wt, ℓt) = max
xt,ht,wt+1
{
U(xt)− ht + βE
[
V B(wt+1)
]}
(1)
s.t. xt + φ
′
twt+1 = ht + φtwt − ℓt + T
where wt = (mt, at), φ
′
t = (φt, ψt), and φt = (φt, 1). ℓt stands for the collateralized loan which
is made last sub-period, and so must be paid back in the form of CM goods. Tt is a lump-sum
transfer to the buyer. V B represents the buyer’s value function in the next period DM. It can
be easily verified that xt = x
∗ at the optimum. Substituting ht in the budget constraint into the
value functionWB yields
WB(wt, ℓt) = φtwt − ℓt + Λ
B
t (2)
where ΛBt ≡ U(x
∗)−x∗+Tt+maxxt,wt+1{−φ
′
twt+1+βE
[
V B(wt+1)
]
}. Notice that the value func-
tion in the CM is linear in the choice variables due to the quasi-linearity of U , as in the standard
7
models which are based on Lagos and Wright (2005). Consequently, the optimal choices of the
buyer do not depend on the current state variables.
Next, consider a representative seller with money, bonds, and the collateralized loan who
enters the CM. The loan is paid back by the counterpart buyer who she met in the previous DM.
W S(wt, ℓt) = max
xt,ht
{
U(xt)− ht + βE
[
V S(0)
]}
s.t. xt = ht + φtwt + ℓt
where V S denotes the seller’s value function in the DM. Notice that wt+1 = 0 for the seller.
Since the seller does not consume any good in the DM, she has no incentive to bring money
and bonds to the next period DM, when the money holding cost is strictly positive due to
µt > β − 1.
10 It is also easily verified that xt = x
∗ at the optimum as in the case of the buyer.
Replacing ht into the value function yields
W S(wt, ℓt) = φtwt + ℓt + Λ
S
t (3)
where ΛSt ≡ U(x
∗)− x∗ + βE[V S(0)].
Next, the DM opens. Buyers and sellers visit the DM1 with the probability θ and the DM2
with the probability 1−θ. Also, all agents match in eachDM.Hence, the expected value function
of a buyer with portfolio wt in the DM is given by
E
[
V B(wt)
]
= θ
[
u(q1t ) +W
B(wt − pt, 0)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
u(q2t ) +W
B(wt, ℓt)
]
(4)
where pt = (p
m
t , p
a
t ) is a portfolio exchanged for DM goods in a meeting with a seller in the
DM1, and ℓt is a collateralized loan made in the DM2. q
1
t (q
2
t ) represents the quantity that are
traded in the DM1 (DM2). The terms of trades in each market are determined by bargaining in
pairwise meetings which Section 2.3 describes.
The value function of a seller is similar except for the fact that the seller does not bring any
money and bonds to the DM for transactions.
E
[
V S(0)
]
= θ
[
−q1t +W
S(pt, 0)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
−q2t +W
S(0, ℓt)
]
2.3 Bargaining Problems in the DM
There are two sub-markets in the DM: DM1 and DM2, depending on what type of means of
payment can be used in transactions. First, consider a meeting in the DM1 where a buyer with
portfoliowt meets with a seller. Sellers accept both money and bonds as a medium of exchange.
10See Rocheteau and Wright (2005b) for the precise and careful proof.
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However, only a fraction g of bonds can only be accepted. A buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it
(henceforth TIOLI) offer to a seller to determine the terms of trade, i.e., the quantity of DM
goods, and a total payment of money and bonds exchanged between them. Specifically, she
maximizes her surplus under the seller’s participation constraint and her budget constraint.
Then, the bargaining problem is expressed by
max
q1t ,pt
{
u(q1t ) +W
B(wt − pt, 0)−W
B(wt, 0)
}
(5)
s.t.− q1t +W
S(pt, 0)−W
S(0, 0) = 0,
and the effective budget constraint pt ≤ w˜t, and w˜t ≡ (mt, g · at). Notice that, since bonds are
not as liquid as money in the DM1, i.e., only a fraction g ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can be used as a
MOE, the real value of the effective budget is less than that of the total budget. I will consider
an extreme case where g → 1 later to discuss under what conditions negative nominal yields
emerge. Substituting (2) and (3) into (5) simplifies the bargaining problem as follows.
max
q1t ,pt
{
u(q1t )− φtpt
}
(6)
s.t.− q1t + φtpt = 0,
and pt ≤ w˜t. The following lemma summarizes the terms of trade which are determined by the
solutions to bargaining problem.
Lemma 1. The real balances of a representative buyer are denoted as z(wt) ≡ φtwt. Define q
∗ = {q :
u′(qt) = 1}, and z
∗ as the real balances of the portfolio (mt, at) such that φtmt + gat = q
∗. Also, p∗ is
the pairs of (mt, at) in z
∗. Then, the terms of trade are given by
q1t (wt) =

q
∗, if z(wt) ≥ z
∗,
z(w˜t), if z(wt) < z
∗.
pt(wt) =

p
∗, if z(wt) ≥ z
∗,
wt, if z(wt) < z
∗.
(7)
Proof. See the appendix
Similarly, in the DM2, a buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller as in the DM1.
However, she maximizes her surplus subject to a different constraint, which is the credit limit
constraint, unlike the effective budget constraint in DM1. Then, the bargaining problem is
described as follows.
max
q2t ,ℓt
{
u(q2t ) +W
B(wt, ℓt)−W
B(wt, 0)
}
(8)
s.t.− q2t +W
S(0, ℓt)−W
S(0, 0) = 0,
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and the credit limit constraint ℓt ≤ hat. Substituting (2) and (3) into (8) yields the following
expression.
max
q2t ,ℓt
{
u(q2t )− ℓt
}
(9)
−q2t + ℓt = 0, (10)
and ℓt ≤ hat. The solution to the bargaining problem is described by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Define the total real value of a buyer’s bond holdings as za(wt) ≡ hat. Also, define z
a∗ ≡ q∗.
The terms of trade are given by
q2t (wt) =

q
∗, if za(wt) ≥ z
a∗,
za(wt), if z
a(wt) < z
a∗,
ℓ(w) =

z
a∗, if za(wt) ≥ z
a∗,
za(wt), if z
a(wt) < z
a∗.
(11)
Proof. See the appendix
Since buyers make a TIOLI offer, the solution is straightforward. The main variables to
determine the level of DM goods produced are the real balances, or the bond holdings of buyers
in each transaction. For example, if the real balances are enough to get the optimal consumption
level q∗, i.e., if z(wt) ≥ z
∗, then the optimal q∗ level will be exchanged with the corresponding
payment, z∗, which can be less than z(wt). On the other hand, if the real balances are not
enough in the same sense, then the buyers will hand over all of their real balances to sellers to
purchase asmanyDMgoods as possible. Sellers will produce the quantity that her participation
constraint implies. The similar interpretation can be applied to the DM2.
2.4 Buyers’ Optimal Choices
Now, I describe the objective function which a buyer maximizes by choosing money and bonds
(mt+1, at+1) in the DM. Substituting (4) into the inside of the maximization operator in (1) and
using linearity of the value functions yield the following objective function J .
J = −φ′twt+1 + β
{
θ
[
u(q1t+1) + φt+1(wt+1 − pt+1)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
u(q2t+1) + φt+1wt+1 − ℓt+1
]}
(12)
The first term stands for the cost of choosing money and bonds which buyers bring to the
forthcoming DM. The terms in the curly bracket show the benefits that they can obtain from
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transactions in the DM subject to their portfolios. Then, the Euler equations are given by
φt = β
[
(1− θ) + θu′
(
min{φt+1w˜t+1, q
∗})
)]
φt+1, (13)
ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1− g) + gu′
(
min{φt+1w˜t+1, q
∗}
) ]
+ (1− θ)
[
(1− h) + hu′ (min{hat+1, q
∗})
]}
, (14)
The left-hand side on each Euler equation shows themarginal cost of buying a unit of money
or government bond. It is equal to its price to be paid when a buyer purchase it in the CM. On
the other hand, the right-hand side is the marginal benefit from holding it in the DM. Buyers
can use them as a medium of exchange to purchase DM goods produced by sellers. If they are
not used in the DM, i.e., if u′s are the unit on the right-hand side, their prices should be equal
to their fundamental value, βφt+1 and β, respectively.
Figure 2 presents the continuous and decreasing money demand against the cost of holding
money captured by φt/(φt+1β), which comes from equation (13). Similarly, inserting equation
(13) into (14) shows the inverse bond demand curve against its price as in Figure 3. Their
inverse relationship makes sense because the bond price implies the cost of holding the bonds,
given the fixed dividend in the forthcoming CM. Also, the bond demand curve depends on the
cost of holding money. It is easily found that the curve shifts out (in) as the money holding
cost increases (decreases). This relationship is intuitively straightforward to understand. If
the money holding cost increases, agents become less willing to hold money, i.e., the money
demandwill decrease. However, since the government bonds can also play a role in relaxing the
liquidity constraint in the DM to some extent as money does, the demand on the government
bonds will increase. Notice that both demand curves are flat in the regions where m ≥ m∗
and hat ≥ q
∗, respectively. This is because one extra unit of money or government bond is
not useful in the DM transactions any more. In these territories, buyers already hold money or
bonds enough to purchase q∗.
2.5 Equilibrium and Characterization
I focus on stationarity equilibria, in which both real money and bond balances are constant over
time. It implies that φtMt = φt+1Mt+1 and At = A. Then, the money growth rate is equal to the
inflation rate in the CM, i.e., 1 + µ = φt/φt+1 = 1 + π.
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium is a list of real balances of buyers, z˜t = φtMt + gA, and
bond holdings z˜a = hA, money and bond prices φ′t, bilateral terms of trade in DM1: q(wt) and
p(wt)which are given by Lemma 1, and bilateral terms of trade inDM2: q(wt) and ℓ(wt)which
are given by Lemma 2 such that:
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(i) the decision rule of a representative buyer solves the individual optimization problem (1),
taking prices φ′t and φt/φt+1 = 1 + µ as given;
(ii) the terms of trade in the DM satisfy (7) and (11);
(iii) prices are such that the CM clears, i.e.,wt+1 = [µMt, A] for buyers.
Then, the following lemma summarizes the equilibrium objects.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique steady state equilibrium with four different cases.
(i) If z˜t ≥ z
∗ and z˜a ≥ z∗, then, q1t = q
2
t = q
∗, φt = (z
∗ − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β;
(ii) If z˜t ≥ z
∗ and z˜a < z∗, then, q1t = q
∗, q2t = z˜
a
t , φt = (z
∗ − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β{θ+ (1− θ)
[
(1−
h) + hu′(q2t )
]
};
(iii) If z˜t < z
∗ and z˜a ≥ z∗, then, q1t = z˜t, q
2
t = q
∗, φt = (q
1
t − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1 − g) +
gu′ (q1t )
]
+ (1− θ)
}
;
(iv) If z˜t < z
∗ and z˜a < z∗, then, q1t = z˜t, q
2
t = z˜
a
t , φt = (q
1
t − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1 − g) +
gu′ (q1t )
]
+ (1− θ)
[
(1− h) + hu′ (q2t )
]}
.
Proof. See the appendix.
It is straightforward to understand the definition of equilibrium. The fact that the real
money balances and the bond supply are constant over time in the steady state implies that
both z˜t and z˜
a are constant. Then, given the market clearing condition, z˜t and z˜
a determine the
quantities and real money and bond balances exchanged in the DM, following Lemma 1 and 2.
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Now, the Euler equations, (13) and (14), for the optimal money and bond holdings with the
above definition can be reexpressed as follows.
φt = β
{
1 + θ [u′ (min{z˜t+1, q
∗})− 1]
}
φt+1 (15)
ψt = β
{
1 + θ · g [u′ (min{z˜t+1, q
∗})− 1] + (1− θ)h [u′ (min{z˜a, q∗})− 1]
}
(16)
These two equations present how the equilibrium prices of money and bonds are deter-
mined. First, let’s look at equation (16) for the real bond price which we are interested in. The
current bond price (ψt on the left hand side) is equal to the sum of its fundamental value (β)
and the weighted average of its marginal benefits in the DM1 and DM2. Each of these marginal
benefits is called the liquidity premium. Similarly, the real money price is also determined by
its fundamental value and liquidity premium. Now, in order to examine how the equilibrium
bond price responds to changes in money and bond supply, let’s plug (15) into (16), then the
price is as follows.
ψ = β
{
1 + g(
1 + µ
β
− 1) + (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1]
}
(17)
= β
{
1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1]
}
(18)
where i ≡ (1 + µ)/β − 1. There are several interesting points to notice here. First of all, the last
equation is obtained by the Fisher equation, because µ = π in the stationary equilibrium and
1/β = 1+ r, where r stands for the yield on a real bond which is not useful in the DM exchange
in the sense that it is not accepted by sellers. Hence, i represents a nominal interest rate of a
totally illiquid real bond. Its real price (β), which is the inverse of the real interest rate 1/β, is
exactly equal to asset prices which are derived in the traditional asset pricing models where
assets are only used as a store of value and their supply does not affect their prices: the asset
prices equal the present discount value of their future stream of consumption dividends. It is
worth noticing that both of money growth rate (µ) and the nominal interest rate (i) represent
the opportunity cost of holding money at the end. Second, the price of a liquid bond (ψ) is
always higher than that of a illiquid bond (β) when the asset supply is not enough in the sense
that hA < q∗, i.e., u′(z˜a) > 1. In other words, the rate of return on a liquid bond is lower
than that on an illiquid, i.e., ρ < i.11 Hence, it implies that the difference between them can
be used to measure the market price of the liquidity service that the liquid bond provides, i.e.,
the liquidity premium. Lastly, the zero net nominal interest rate (i = 0) implies that the money
growth equals the Friedman rule, i.e., µ = β − 1 and thereby the money growth rate does not
affect the bond price any more.
11To distinguish nominal yields between an illiquid bond and an liquid bond, let ρ denote the latter.
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More importantly, equations (17) and (18) present that not only bond supply but also money
growth rate determine the equilibrium bond price together with the bond demand when 0 <
g < 1, i.e., only when they are substitutes to some extent in the sense that bonds help to relax
the liquidity constraint in the DM1 as money does. This implies that the demand on money
and bonds are interconnected because both of them are useful in exchange process, to a greater
and lesser extent, as in the papers in the money search literature such as Geromichalos, Licari,
and Suarez-Lledo (2007) in which money and real assets are perfect substitutes, and Lester,
Postlewaite, andWright (2012) in which the illiquid parameter g is endogenized. It is important
to notice that the price of the illiquid bond is fixed at β over time, whereas the price of the liquid
bond varies with both money and bond supply. Hence, the price variation of the liquid bond is
equal to the variation of the liquidity premium, and the two words can be used interchangeably
when the bond price exceed the fundamental value.
Next, it is necessary to think about the existence of non-monetary equilibria. Not all µ ∈
(β − 1,∞) are consistent with monetary equilibria. The next corollary describes the range of
money growth rate for the monetary equilibria when gA < q∗.
Corollary 1. A monetary equilibrium is supported on the range of (β − 1, µ¯), where µ¯ ≡ {µ : µ =
β[1 + θ[u′(gA)− 1]]− 1}.
Proof. See the appendix.
First, if gA = q∗, µ¯ = 0. In this economy, money does not play any role in providing
liquidity services, and therefore there only exist the non-monetary equilibria. As µ increases,
buyers reduce their money balances to optimize their choices. However, if the money growth
rate is higher than the upper bond, µ¯, they do not hold any money for the transaction in the
DM, because it lead to less consumption. On the other hand, if we allow for the case where
µ = β − 1, it implies z˜ ≥ q∗, and so will be the lower bound for a monetary equilibrium. In this
case, the marginal change in money supply never affect the liquidity premium of a liquid bond.
On the other hand, the upper bound µ¯ decreases in bond supply A. It implies that agents are
less patient with high inflation, so that less willing to hold money given the supply of money,
as the supply of bond increases.
The following proposition summarizes how the real equilibrium bond price, or the liquidity
premium, is associated with money and bond supply. As mentioned in the introduction, we
focus more on the monetary equilibria, where µ ∈ (β − 1, µ¯).
Proposition 1. The real bond price exceeds the fundamental value, i.e, ψ > β, as long as µ > β − 1.
Also, it is increasing in µ but decreasing in A: ∂ψ/∂µ > 0 and ∂ψ/∂A < 0.
The proof is straightforward. Notice in Proposition 1 that µ is also replaced with i because
they are linear by the definition as in equation (18), and both of them stand for the money
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holding cost in the model. The real bond price exceeds its fundamental value because a liquid
bond plays a role in facilitating transactions in the DM; otherwise would not occur. Hence,
the liquid bond bears a liquidity premium. Money growth rate positively affects the liquidity
premium. For example, high µ implies the high opportunity cost of holding money, so that it
leads to an increase in the demand on bonds and ends up with the high bond price. On the
other hand, bond supply negatively affects the liquidity premium, because the bond supply
has an less impact on relaxing the liquidity constraint in the DM exchange as it increases. The
marginal benefit decreases. In addition, if z˜a ≥ q∗, i.e., the bond supply is plentiful in that it
allows agents to purchase the first best quantity, q∗, in the DM2 even though the probability of
visiting DM2 1− θ is positive. The marginal increase in the bond supply does not allow buyers
to purchase additional goods in the DM2 any more. As a result, changing the bond supply
does not affect transactions in the DM2, but only in DM1; therefore it leads to the zero liquidity
premium through DM2.
Now, consider now some extreme cases where money and bonds are perfect substitutes
or not substitutes at all so as to understand intuitively how the parameters, g and 1 − θ, can
affect bond prices, or the liquidity premium. Moreover, this will help for better understanding
about empirical tests, and allow us to check which case can be well supported by the U.S. data
in Section 3. As mentioned in subsection 2.1, g is an illiquid parameter, implying how liquid
bonds are, comparing with money in DM transactions. This parameter can be also interpreted
as a parameter of how developed or how liquid a secondary asset market is, where bonds
are exchanged for money. For instance, less friction in the secondary market implies higher g
because it means that bonds are more easily converted to money, vice versa. In addition, if there
are more investors or buyers for bonds due to the developed institution, including high-quality
trading platform technology of secondary markets, bonds can be liquidated more easily, and so
to provide liquidity services better. On the other hand, the parameter 1 − θ can be interpreted
as how well the collateralized credit market functions, where money would not work, or how
strong demand on liquid and high quality of bonds is in repo contracts. More collateralized
transactions in the credit market can lead to higher 1− θ.
Now, consider the four cases as follows, depending on the different combinations of g and
θ (or 1-θ). All the results are delivered by equations (17) and (18).
(Case 1: Perfectly illiquid bonds) Bonds are totally illiquid in the sense that they are useless
in the DM exchange, i.e., g → 0 and θ → 1. This is the case where the bonds only function
as a store of value. Hence, the real bond price ψ is equal to the fundamental value, β, i.e., the
present value of the dividend that the bonds deliver next period, and so they do not carry the
liquidity premium at all. As a result, it is not affected by money and bond supply at all.
(Case 2: Perfect substitutes to money) Bonds are perfect substitutes to money and the DM2
does not exists, i.e., g → 1 and θ→ 1. The bond prices are equal to 1+µ. Then its nominal yield
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ρ is give by
1 + ρ = (1 + π)
1
ψ
= φt/φt+1 × φt+1/φt = 1. (19)
The gross nominal interest rate (1 + ρ) equals 1 and the net nominal interest rate equals zero all
the times. In this case, since the bonds are identical with money in terms of ability of facilitat-
ing transactions in the DM and additionally deliver dividends, their real prices are higher than
the fundamental value β. Moreover, a high (a low) money growth rate causes high (low) real
prices, or the liquidity premia.
(Case 3: Liquid bonds but not substitutes to money) Bonds are liquid in the DM, but not substi-
tutes to money at all, i.e., g → 0 and 0 < θ < 1. This is the case where the bonds are perfectly
illiquid in the DM1, but liquid in the DM2. This implies that the two decentralized markets
are totally separated. Hence, the supply of each does not affect each other, so that the liquidity
premia which the bonds carry is only affected by their supply, not by the money growth rate.
(Case 4: Liquid bonds and perfect substitutes) Bonds are liquid in the DM2 and also perfect sub-
stitutes to money in the DM1, i.e., g → 1 and 0 < θ < 1. Bonds carry extra values in exchange
process. Then, equation (17) yield the net nominal interest rate as follows.
ρ =
−β(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
(1 + µ) + β(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
(20)
=
(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
i+ (1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
< 0 (21)
In this case, the numerator is always negative only if u′(hA) > 1, i.e., only if bond supply is
scarce. Also, the liquidity premium is affected by both money and money supply. The nominal
rate of return on a liquid bond is negative, irrespective of money and bond supply, or the
nominal rate of return on a illiquid bond i. It implies that lenders are willing to pay interests to
buyers even though it is lenders who take default risk on lending, because the bonds provide
extra liquidity services in transactions. I will discuss more details about whether the liquidity
properties of bonds can cause the negative yield or not in reality, and under what conditions
the negative yields emerge in a generic case, unlike this extreme case, in Section 4.
3 Data and Empirical Results
The theory in the previous section predicts that the real price of a liquid bond, or the liquidity
premium is affected by both money and bond supply in a general case where 0 < g, θ < 1,
whereas that of an illiquid bond is not affected, as summarized in Proposition 1. In this section,
I empirically test the predictions with the U.S. data: whether the liquidity premium is positively
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associated with the money growth rate, but negatively with bond supply in reality. Also, I will
choose a nominal interest rate which can reflect the opportunity cost of holding money as the
money growth rate does, and test whether it is positively related with the liquidity premium.
Notice that I focus on the liquidity premium rather than the real price, because it does not seem
to reach a consensus on how to measure the real price of a liquid and default-free bond in the
literature, but when it comes to the liquidity premium, there exist proxies which are widely
used in the literature. For this reason, Equations (22) and (23) described below are used as a
guide for the empirical analysis.
3.1 Data
First of all, it is important to discuss how to measure all of the variables mentioned in the theory
such as the liquidity premium, money growth rate (or the nominal interest rate of an illiquid
bond), and bond supply from the data before we move on to the empirical results. As well
known, the liquidity premia of liquid bonds are not observed in reality. Also, there exist several
types of monetary aggregates, such as Monetary Base, Narrow Money, M1, and M2 which we
can use to measure money supply, and a variety of liquid government bonds are traded in the
financial market.
First, I describe how to measure the liquidity premium. The problem is that neither the
real yield nor the liquidity premium can be obtained as officially published indexes. Only the
nominal yield is observable. However, the yield spreads between two different bonds only
in terms of liquidity can be used as a proxy of the liquidity premium as widely used in the
relevant literature. Of course, they should have the same, or at least similar maturities and
default risks. These measures are not only computational, but also appropriate to empirically
test the predictions from the theory, because the real prices of liquid bonds are affected by
money and bond supply through their liquidity premium, whereas the real prices of illiquid
bonds are not. Also, this is why changes in the real yield on a liquid bond are equivalent to
changes in the liquidity premiumwhich the bond carries in the theory. For this reason, I choose
pairs of liquid and illiquid bonds of the same or similar maturity and safety.
The theory presents the nominal yield of an illiquid bond (i), a liquid bond (ρ), and the
17
spread (s) between them as follows.
1 + i = (1 + π)(1 + r) = (1 + π)
1
β
1 + ρ = (1 + π)
1
ψ
s = i− ρ ≈ ψ − β =
[
1 + g(
1 + µ
β
− 1)
]
+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1] (22)
= 1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1] , (23)
where r stands for the real yield on an illiquid bond. The first two equations present the nomi-
nal yields of an illiquid bond and a liquid bond by the Fisher equation, respectively. Then, the
log difference between them is approximately equal to the yield spread between them, which
is given by Equations (22) and (23). Notice that this difference eliminates the effect of inflation
on the nominal yields of both bonds at the same time, and therefore delivers the real yield dif-
ferential in two different bonds in terms of liquidity, i.e., the liquidity premium. Notice that
I attempt to eliminate other components such as the risk premium and the term premium in
bond prices by choosing the pairs of bonds of same or similar maturities and default risks.
Then, what types of bonds can represent liquid and illiquid bonds in reality? First, when
it comes to a liquid bond, we define a liquid bond in the model as a bond which is useful in
exchange process. In reality, it implies that the liquid bond should be easy to be sold for cash
in secondary asset markets, to be accepted directly as a medium of exchange, or to be used for
credit (or loans) in the credit markets such as the Repurchase Agreement market (or REPO in
short) and the collateralized federal funds market. Moreover, it should be safe in the sense that
it is sure to deliver its dividend at maturity, i.e., there is no probability to default before matu-
rity. For this reason, here, I use the yields of U.S. Treasuries such as Treasury bonds, notes and
bills, as the nominal yields of the liquid bond meant by the model. They all represent liquid
bonds with different maturities.
On the other hand, an illiquid bond in the model implies a bond which can not be used in
exchange, and its holder should keep it in his hand until maturity for cash unless she accepts
a huge discount for the secondary trade. Hence, it is inferior to the liquid bond only in terms
of being liquidated or relaxing her liquidity constraint. Of course, they should be exactly or, at
least, similarly as safe as the liquid bond to avoid the case where their yield difference includes
the risk premium. In the case where there is only a small difference in terms of the default
risk, it could be controlled in regressions by adding variables to explain it, even though it is
not perfect. Similarly, the maturities should be matched for both bonds.12 Taking all of these
12In reality, since there exist secondary trade markets for almost all of bonds only if sellers of bonds accept more
or less, or even considerable losses, there would not exist a perfectly illiquid bond. In other words, it is hard to
find totally illiquid bonds, even if they are almost as safe as Treasuries and have the same or similar maturities.
However, it cannot be denied that the yield spread reflects the liquidity premium, even if we consider it.
18
into account, I use the yields of the long term Aaa-rated corporate bonds, 3-month Commercial
Papers, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured Certificates of deposits (hence-
forth FDIC CDs) as measures of the yields of illiquid bonds. When it comes to these data, I
almost use the data set provided by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)13. I match
each of those yields with Treasuries with consideration for maturity in order to compute the
liquidity premium on each maturity.
Lastly, I also use the TED spread as a measure of the liquidity premium on three-month
Treasury bills, which is the difference between three-month LIBOR based on US dollars and
three-month Treasury bill. This spread is used frequently as a measure for the liquidity pre-
mium in the literature. It is true that 3-month LIBOR based on US dollars bears the risk pre-
mium, because the contracts between banks are not default-free. However, it is also true that
it is small. I try to control the default risk by adding a variable to represent default risk in the
regression.
Next, let’s consider which of monetary aggregates should be used to measure money supply
in the data. As mentioned above, there are several monetary aggregates which are complied
by the Fed: Monetary Base, Narrow Money, M1, M2, and M3. However, there are two criteria
for which one among them is appropriate. First, what the theory regards as money is per-
fectly liquid in exchange process, or it is a perfect medium of exchange, comparing to bonds.
Hence, the monetary aggregate meant by the theory should not include any type of illiquid
financial assets such as savings deposits including money market deposit accounts and small-
denomination time deposits, which is precisely defined as time deposits in amounts of less
than $100,000.14 Then, this criterion excludes M2, and also broader monetary aggregates such
as M3. Secondly, its demand against the opportunity cost of holding it, which can be repre-
sented by nominal interest rates (or the inflation rate), should be stable. They should have a
stable negative relationship. Otherwise, the mechanism through which the theory works could
not be applied to explain the relationship between money supply and the liquidity premium.
Specifically, it should be true that, when the opportunity cost of holding money rises up, the
demand declines. If it is not true, the high money holding cost will never lead to an increase in
the demand on liquid bonds as a substitute to money, and neither does the liquidity premium
the bonds bear in the end. It turns out that the demand on M1 against the nominal interest rate
has not been stable, so that M1 is excluded in the regressions shown later.15
As a result, I use Narrow Money as a measure of money, based on these criteria. Narrow
Money is well suited to the theory in the sense that it is absolutely used as a medium of ex-
13I updated the yields of Aaa-rated corporate bonds (series AAA), and 3-month Commercial Papers (series
CP3M and CP3M ) in their dataset with the data FRED Economic Data (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/) provides
because some values are revised. See the appendix in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for more
details.
14Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/default.htm
15See Lucas Jr. and Nicolini (2015) for details about the stability of M1. The paper investigates why monetary
aggregates become unstable over time.
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change in transactions. Also, it presents a stable demand curve over the sample period, i.e., a
unambiguously negative relationship with the nominal interest rate over the period from 1946
to 2008. Notice that I use the federal funds rate as a proxy of the opportunity cost of holding
money, which is the nominal interest rate on an illiquid bond in the theory. I could use other
interest rates such as 3 month commercial paper rate, but they deliver the same relationship
because all the short term interest rates, including 3 month commercial paper rate, show the
strong co-movement historically. Figure 4 displays the ratio of NarrowMoney to nominal GDP
against its holding cost (i), which implies L = M/PY in order to look at the real demand on
money or real money balances proportional to Y implied by Equation (15). In the case where
bond supply is not plentiful to achieve the first best outcome in the DM, it can be re-expressed
to present the money demand in the equilibrium as follows.
φt
φt+1β
= 1 + θ [u′(z˜)− 1]
⇔ 1 + i = 1 + θ [u′(z˜)− 1] ,
where φt
φt+1β
= 1+ i.16 Obviously, the graph on the left panel presents that the real balances z˜, or
money demand mˆ is negatively associated with a nominal interest rate, or the opportunity cost
of holding money, which is represented by the federal funds rate.
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Figure 5: Bond Demand
Also, notice that money growth rate has a one to one relationship with the nominal yield
of an illiquid bond in the stationary equilibrium, which is implied by the Fisher equation, i.e.,
1+ i = (1+π)(1+r) = (1+µ)/β, as seen in Equations (22) and (23). They theoretically stand for
the same economic notion: the opportunity cost of holding money. The theory does not distin-
guish between them. The empirical result can show which variable is more suitable to explain
changes in the liquidity premium. The nominal interest rate as an index of the opportunity cost
of holding money has a positive impact on the liquidity premium through the conceptually
16Since z˜t = z˜t+1 in stationary equilibria, the time subscript is omitted.
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same mechanism in which the money growth rate works. In reality, there are a variety of inter-
est rates in the financial market, and it is also difficult to find the yields of totally illiquid bonds.
However, as well known, they have the strong co-movement relationship among them. Here,
I use the federal funds rate as a proxy of the nominal interest rate which the model presents.
The federal funds rate can reflect the money holding cost better than any other, because it is
highly correlated with the short term interest rates of other financial assets which agents in an
economy can consider as substitutes for cash, even if they are not perfectly substitutes. More-
over, since it is the policy interest rate which the Fed uses, it is comparable to money supply as
a policy variable.
When it comes to bond supply, I use the ratio of the outstanding stock of the public debt to
the nominal GDP for the liquid real bond supply meant by the theory, as in Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). The ratio of debt to GDP is measured as the market value of the pub-
lic debt at the end of a fiscal year divided by the GDP of the same year.17 Using the same data
as in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Nagel (2014) allows for comparison of
my empirical results with the results in the literature.
Last but not least, Figure 518 looks at the bond demand against the yield spread between the
Aaa-rated corporate bond and the long term Treasury bond. Notice that, as Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) points out, it is the bond demand for not only liquidity but also safety,
but it is mainly driven by the demand for the liquidity services which Treasuries provide. It
had been stable up until 2008 in the sense that it is an unambiguous downward sloping curve.
However, after 2009, the demand curve seems to shift out after the recent financial crisis. This
is similar to the money demand curve. For this reason, I only use the data over the period from
1945 up to 2008.
3.2 Empirical Results
Now, I present the empirical test results for the theoretical predictions. As mentioned in the
previous section, I first compute several different yield spreads between illiquid bonds and
Treasuries, matching them according to their maturities: the yield spreads between Aaa-rated
corporate bonds and the long term Treasuries, between Aa-rated commercial papers and 3-
month Treasury bills, and between 6-month FDIC insured Certificates of Deposit (henceforth
CD) and 6-month Treasury bills. The last two Treasuries are short-term bonds in the sense that
their maturities are shorter than one year.19 Each of the spreads stands for the liquidity pre-
mium which each of different maturities of Treasuries bears. It implies that all of these spreads
17See Henning Bohn’s website for more details: http://econ.ucsb.edu/ bohn/data.html
18Source: Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)
19I use the spreads which are used in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) but slightly different because
they are updated from the original source.
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reflect the market values for the liquidity services the Treasuries provide, but different in the
sense that the former is the liquidity premium on the long term Treasuries and the latter on the
short term Treasuries.20
Next, it is important that I use the growth rate of NarrowMoney to represent money supply
in the regressions. As seen in Equation (15), what affects liquidity premia is the growth rate
of money supply, not the absolute level of money supply. it implies that a one-time change in
money supply does not affect the liquidity premia and also other real variables such as real bal-
ances, quantities traded in the DM, but its growth rate does; money supply is not super-neutral
but neutral. A one-time injection or withdraw of money to an economy is ineffective because
its relative price is adjusted to keep the real variables unchanged. On the other hand, I use the
level of the debt to the nominal GDP ratio for bond supply in the regressions, because it is not
neutral unlike money. Even a one-time change in bond supply affects the real variables.
Also, in order to control the risk premium, associated with default risks, which can be in-
cluded in the yield spreads calculated above, a stock market volatility index is used as a default
control variable which is used in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).21 Including this
measure in the regressions attempts to control default risks so that changes in the yield spreads
are driven mainly by changes in the liquidity premia, given the low default rate on Aaa-rated
corporate bonds and Aa-rated Commercial Papers.22 However, unlike these two securities,
FDIC insured CDs are as safe as Treasuries, given FDIC insurance, so that its spread against the
same maturities of Treasuries can be used as a good proxy of the liquidity premium.
Before the regressions, I graphically look at how money growth rate had evolved with the
different measures of the liquidity premium over the sample period from Figures 6 and 7. It
seems to be consistent with the predictions from the theory. The figures show that the move-
ment of money growth is almost positively related to the liquidity premium, and their varia-
tions are also similar in terms of frequency and width.
Now, let’s move onto the empirical test results from the regressions. Table 1 presents the
impacts of money growth, bond supply, and the federal funds rate on the liquidity premium,
which is measured by the yield spreads between the Aaa-rated corporate bond and the long
term Treasury bond, and between FDIC CDs and 6-month Treasury bills. Specifically, Regres-
20Notice that there are two indexeswhich represents the opportunity cost of holding moneymeant by the theory:
money growth rate and nominal interest rates. Even though they are theoretically considered equivalently by the
Fisher equation and the definition of the stationary equilibrium, I will show that there can be cases where only one
of them significantly affect long or short term liquidity premia in the data. In fact, Nagel (2014) only presents the
cases where the federal funds rate has a positive effect on the liquidity premia, which are measured monthly only
by some short term bonds. However, here I present not only that the liquidity premia are also affected by money
growth, but also how it is robust to the liquidity premium of the long term bond such as the long term Treasuries.
21See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for the details about why this measure can be a proxy for
default risk. In short, they argues that this measure have a high correlation with another default risk measure such
as the median expected default frequency credit measure fromMoody’s Analytics.
22See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for details. According to them, “there have never been a
default on high-grade CP.” Also, they use the spread of Aaa-rated bonds against Treasuries to estimate the market
value of the liquidity convenience, assuming that the default risk of the Aaa-rated bonds is low.
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sions (1) to (3) look at the impact of money growth and bond supply on the liquidity premium
which the long-term Treasuries carry. First, the regressions test whether Treasury bonds are sub-
stitutes with money or not. The theory predicts that if they are not substitutes, money growth
does not affect the liquidity premium of Treasuries at all, because the money-traded market are
totally separate from the bond-collaterlized market. In fact, the regression results deliver that
money growth has a significant and positive impact on the liquidity premium. In particular, its
coefficient is 0.56 in Regression (3). Also, bond supply is negatively correlated with the liquid-
ity premium, and its coefficient is -1.33. An increase in bond supply reduces its market price for
the liquidity services which the bonds provide.23 Importantly, all of these results present evi-
dence that Treasury bonds are substantive substitutes with money to some degree in that they
provide liquidity services like money does. Moreover, the results are robust to default risk. A
control variable for default risk is included as an explanatory variable in Regression (3), and the
coefficients of money growth and bond supply are still significant. It is meant to be statistically
robust that the liquidity premium is significantly affected by both of them. The coefficient of
the default risk control variable also appears significant. On the other hand, Regression (4) to
(5) show the impact of the federal funds rate on the liquidity premium. Unlike money growth,
its impact on the liquidity premium appears insignificant in the regressions with bond supply,
even though the federal funds rate as a proxy of the nominal interest rate is equivalent theo-
retically to the money growth, because both of them stand for the opportunity cost of holding
money.
Regressions (6) to (9) also support the previous test result. The FDIC CDs as an illiquid
financial security are as safe as Treasuries, and thereby its spread with Treasuries reflects the
difference in their liquidity premia. Since the FDIC CDs do not have default risk, given FDIC
23The negative effect of bond supply is consistent with the results in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2012) even without the log specification. They use the log specification in their regressions because it provides a
good fit and there is only one parameter they are interested in.
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insurance, this yield spread is a more precise measure of the liquidity premium than the other
measures. The result confirms the existence of the liquidity premium, even in regression (8)
with a default risk control variable: money growth has a positive impact on the liquidity pre-
mium and the Treasury supply has a negative impact. Regression (8) presents that a one per-
centage point in themoney growth rate is associated with an increase of 2.39 bps in the liquidity
premium in 6-month Treasury bills, whereas a one percentage point in bond supply with a de-
crease of 4.49 bps. However, the effect of the federal funds rate turns out to be insignificant as
in Regression (5).
Table 1: Impact on the Liquidity Premium of Long-Term and 6-Month Treasuries
Dependent Vars AAA Corp. - Treasury FDIC CDs - T-Bills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1946-2008 1946-2008 1946-2008 1955-2008 1955-2008 1984-2008 1984-2008 1984-2008 1984-2008
NM Growth 1.648** 0.917*** 0.557*** 2.378*** 2.535*** 2.389***
(0.735) (0.244) (0.160) (0.249) (0.231) (0.136)
Debt to GDP -1.496*** -1.326*** -3.795*** -3.188*** -5.471*** -4.494** -5.074***
(0.421) (0.295) (0.710) (0.745) (1.584) (1.768) (1.777)
Federal Funds Rates 0.0219 -0.253 3.657
(1.621) (1.522) (4.626)
Volatility 4.495*** 3.484*** 2.219
(0.893) (0.903) (1.704)
Constant 0.654*** 1.348*** 0.690*** 2.258*** 1.567*** -0.0569 2.151*** 1.446 2.026**
(0.0833) (0.205) (0.211) (0.366) (0.434) (0.134) (0.633) (0.892) (0.785)
Observations 63 63 63 54 54 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R-squared 0.092 0.417 0.610 0.542 0.661 0.272 0.551 0.645 0.206
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The dependent variables are the
yield spreads between private and Treasury bonds, which are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory variables are the growth rate of Narrow Money and
the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. A control variable for the default risk on private assets is V olatility, which is
measured by annualized standard deviation of weekly log stock returns on the S&P 500 index (Source: KVJ 2012). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Next, Table 2 uses different measures of the liquidity premia: the yield spreads of Aa-rated
Commercial Papers against Treasury bills, and the TED spread. All the regressions present that
the impact of money growth is significantly positive and is robust with bond supply and de-
fault risk controls. Also, these results strongly support the theoretical prediction that Treasury
bills are substitutes with money like Treasury bonds, again.24 A one percentage point rise in the
money growth rate causes an increase of around 1.2 bps in the liquidity premium of 3 month
Treasuy Bills, according to Regressions (3) and (7). On the other hand, Regressions (4), and (8)
present whether federal funds rate affects the liquidity premium in the case where bonds are
substitutes with money as in Regressions (3), and (7). The federal funds rate has a significantly
positive impact on the liquidity premia, whereas bond supply does not have a significantly
negative effect.25
24The regressions with the quarterly data over the same period present the similar result. See Appendix B for
the regression results.
25In fact, this result is consistent the results which Nagel (2014) delivers. The paper argues that there is no
significant impact of the bond supply on the time-varying liquidity premium. However, it examines different
measures of the liquidity premium which are not used here.
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To summarize, money growth has a significant and positive impact on the liquidity pre-
mia, whereas bond supply does negative as the theory predicts. Also, the federal funds rate
has a significantly positive effect on it in most of the regressions. Even if money growth and
the nominal interest rate which the federal funds rate stands for are theoretically equivalent in
the sense that both of them represent the opportunity cost of holding money, they seem not to
be equivalent empirically all the times. We can find that the effect of the federal funds rate ap-
pears insignificant in the regressions where the liquidity premia of the long-term Treasuries and
the 6-month Treasuries are used as the dependent variables. These results may come from the
fact that different maturities of Treasuries are traded in different markets, by different agents,
or under different regulations, even though they provide similar liquidity services. Hence, it
would not be a surprise that they can differently respond to various variables which have the
same economic meaning. However, notice that this does not change the economic mechanism
of how money or nominal interest rates affect the liquidity premia which liquid bonds carry.
All the results provide strong support the theoretical predictions: bond prices bear the liquid-
ity premium, bonds are substantive substitutes with money even if not perfect, and the money
holding cost is a primary factor in the mechanism which deliver the aforementioned results.
Table 2: Impact on the Liquidity Premium of 3-Month Treasury Bills
Dependent Vars AA CP - T-Bills TED spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1946-2008 1946-2008 1946-2008 1955-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008
NM Growth 1.681*** 1.256*** 1.168*** 1.341*** 1.343*** 1.209***
(0.543) (0.247) (0.298) (0.194) (0.187) (0.224)
Debt to GDP -0.871* -0.829* -0.564 -0.0543 0.980 0.212
(0.471) (0.430) (1.037) (1.535) (1.665) (1.127)
Volatility 1.097 0.271 2.010 1.608
(1.722) (1.344) (1.464) (1.521)
Federal Funds Rate 9.472*** 9.23*
(3.230) (4.680)
Constant 0.586*** 0.990*** 0.829*** 0.362 0.565*** 0.588 -0.120 -0.082
(0.0784) (0.272) (0.254) (0.435) (0.107) (0.668) (0.808) (0.447)
Observations 63 63 63 54 23 23 23 23
Adjusted R-squared 0.053 0.107 0.111 0.254 0.180 0.139 0.147 0.233
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The dependent vari-
ables are the yield spreads between private and Treasury bonds, which are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory variables are the growth
rate of Narrow Money and the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. A control variable for the default risk on
private assets is V olatility, which is measured by annualized standard deviation of weekly log stock returns on the S&P 500 index (Source:
KVJ 2012). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4 Discussion on Negative Interest Rates
Negative Treasury yields have been observed in some countries such as Switzerland, the United
States, Japan and Germany for the recent years. In particular, since the European Central Bank
lowered its target rate to below zero, not a few European countries have been experiencing the
negative yields on their government bonds, which includes both short and long term bonds.
Since the negative target rate accompanies with the negative interest rate on the excess reserves
deposited in their central banks, the government bonds can be as a safe store value to investors
who hold a large denomination of excess money to their hands, if the target interest rate is neg-
ative. This is the case for most of countries which have been observing the negative yields on
their governments bonds. However, we could also observe two countries where the negative
Treasury yields were observed, even though their monetary policy rates were positive: Switzer-
land and the United States. In Switzerland, the yields of almost all the government bonds have
been negative after 2008. Also, the secondary market yield of 3 month Treasury bills in the
United States had been negative for several days in September, 2015, even if the federal fund
rates were slightly positive. In reality, these two governments bonds are treated similarly in
the sense that investors regard them as safe assets, and thereby as liquid assets domestically
and internationally,26 unlike other government bonds.27 Hence, I use the theory and the data
to examine whether the asset (or bond) liquidity can cause the negative yields, and if so, under
what conditions it can do.
Intuitively, a negative bond yield implies that a bond buyer or lender pays a bond issuer
or borrower interests on her lending. It wouldn’t make sense if the interest rate were consid-
ered as the risk premium which is compensated for the borrower’ default risk, because it is the
lender that takes the default risk of the loan. On the other hand, money is also a liability issued
by a government (a consolidated authority) as government bonds, and therefore money is un-
ambiguously as safe as the government bonds. The existence of money implies that the lender
could hold cash, as an perfect alternative or substitute to bonds, whose interest rate is 0%, i.e.,
non-negative. Or, if the lender were a financial institution, it could hold money as a reserve
deposit its central bank, because it pays a positive interest. Hence, I argue here that this nega-
tive Treasury yields can be caused by liquidity properties of government bonds, rather than by
safety properties, and so I use the theory set up in the previous section and the relevant data to
explore the possibility of asset liquidity based rationale of the observed negative yields.
26According to Aleks Berentsen, Swiss government bonds can be used as collateral in some markets outside of
Switzerland but where the Swiss franc cannot like American government bonds.
27The yields of both Swiss and American government bonds fell down after the 2008 financial crisis started,
whereas the yields of other government bonds rose up a lot because of their default risk.
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As shown in the previous section, the yield of a liquid bond from the model is given by
ρ =
(1− g)
[
1+µ
β
− 1
]
− (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
(1− g) + g 1+µ
β
+ (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
(24)
=
(1− g)i− (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
. (25)
The following proposition summarizes under what conditions a bond’s liquidity can cause the
negative yield.
Proposition 2. The yield on a liquid bond falls below zero under the following conditions, and it is
caused by bond liquidity.
(i) If 1− θ = 0, the yield on a liquid bond is negative, only when i < 0.
(ii) If 1− θ 6= 0, the yield on a liquid bond can be negative, even when i ≥ 0,
a) if i = 0 and u′(za) > 1, i.e., the nominal yield on an illiquid bond is zero and the liquidity
premium is positive, or
b) if i > 0 and i < (1−θ)h [u′(za)− 1] /(1−g)., i.e., a certain portion of the marginal liquidity
service benefit provided by a liquid bond is greater than the marginal cost of holding money.
The proof is straightforward from equation (25) and thereby is omitted here. The theory
predicts the following interesting results. First of all, if there do not exist financial markets such
as Repo markets where there exists strong demand on liquid bonds for their liquidity services,
called DM2 in the model, negative yields on liquid bonds (or, government bonds) can not be
negative even when i, as a proxy of the money holding cost, is positive. Specifically, the DM2
is the market where government bonds are used in Repo contracts as collateral, but would not
money. If we think about i as a monetary policy rate or other short term interest rates, the cases
of Switzerland and the U.S. would not happen, because the monetary policy target range in
Switzerland had been positive until December in 201428 and the federal funds rate has never
been negative so far. However, if there exist DM2, i.e., 1− θ 6= 0, the negative yield can emerge,
in particular, when bond supply is scarce and the monetary policy rate is low: money is redun-
dant and therefore the opportunity cost of holding money is low. In other words, the negative
yield can appear even in the situation where the policy rate is positive. This implies that the
liquidity services which liquid bonds provide are valued high relatively to the money holding
cost. As a result, bond buyers become willing to hold the bonds with negative yields in their
portfolios and to use in transactions.
Interestingly, the case of Switzerland is exactly consistent with the predictions of the the-
ory. As mentioned above, we could observe the negative Treasury yields even during period
28It is fixed at 0 - 1.00% on 12/11/2008, 0 - 0.75% on 3/12/2009, 0 - 0.25% on 8/3/2011, -0.75 - 0.25% on
12/18/2014, and -1.25 - -0.25% on 1/15/2015.
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when its monetary policy target was positive. As shown in Figure 8, the negative yields on
government bonds emerged around 2010 for the first time. Also, it presents huge changes in
money and the government bond supply around the 2007-2008. For example, the ratio of the
government bond supply relative to GDP was higher than 50%, but fell down to around 30%,
whereas the money supply, measured by M129, relatively increased more than twice during the
same period, and also it grew at a higher rate. Moreover, the interest target range of the Swiss
National Bank was 0-1.00% at then end of 2008, and then, continued to hover around zero. Ac-
cording to both theoretical and empirical results, all of these data strongly suggest the idea that
these two changes would increase the liquidity premia, and also cause the negative Treasury
yields. In other words, the relative scarcity of the liquid government bonds against money in
the market would have led to the negative yields through an increase in the liquidity premia
on the government bonds.
Figure 8: Interest Rates, Money and Gov’t Bond Supply in Switzerland
Moreover, we can find another example even in the United States. In particular, the theory is
also consistent with the comments from the market participants during the periods when nega-
tive nominal yields on Treasuries were observed in the US. For example, according to Bloomberg
(September 25, 2015), Kenneth Silliman, head of US short-term rates trading in New York at TD
Securities unit, one of 22 primary dealers that trade with the Fed said,
“Yields on U.S. Treasury bills fell below zero as an influx of cash and pent-up appetite for safe as-
sets led investors to accept negative returns after the Federal Reserve decided not to raise its short-term
29It includes currency in circulation, sight deposits and deposits in transaction accounts.
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interest rate. ...... Investors will have additional funds totaling about $100 billion returned to them in
the next month as the government cuts bill supply heading into negotiations with Congress about the
statutory debt limit”, 3031
In brief, he mentions that the main factors which drove down the nominal bond yields to
below zero were ‘a cut in bill supply’ and the low short term interest rate. Notice that the pol-
icy rate of the Fed, has been hovering around zero for more than 7 years since 2008. In other
words, when the negative bond yields occurred, the money holding cost was low, and also the
bill supply was expected to decrease and to be low relatively. However, there have existed
strong demand on the government bonds. Both factors were at work together in the direction
to raise up the liquidity premium of liquid bonds such as Treasury bills, so that the nominal
bond yields seem to fall down to the negative territory even during the short time period.
To summarize, the observed data in Switzerland and the United States strongly suggest that
the low money holding cost and the scarcity of liquid bonds could cause the negative Treasury
yields through the liquidity channel in both countries.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores the effects of monetary policy on the liquidity premia counted in the prices
of liquid financial assets such as government bonds. The theory delivers elaborate predictions
about under which conditions and through what mechanism money growth can affect the liq-
uidity premia. For example, money growth rate, not its level, has a positive relationship with
them because high money growth rate implies the high opportunity cost of holding money and
thereby the high demand on liquid bonds only when liquid bond supply are scarce. Also, the
theory provides a rationale that this mechanism works because liquid bonds play a role as sub-
stitutes to money in part. On the other hand, the level of liquid bond supply also directly affects
the liquidity premia by changing relative scarcity of the bonds. The empirical analysis with the
U.S. data provides a strong support for the theoretical predictions: the money growth rate, not
its level, is positively correlated with the liquidity premia, whereas bond supply negatively.
Last but not least, the paper explains how the liquidity premia are associated with the negative
nominal yields on liquid bonds which were observed in the US and Switzerland. The theory
30Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-17/treasury-bill-yields-turn-negative-as-fed-
leaves-rates-unchanged
31See the following comment in The Wall Street Journal (Sept 23, 2014) for another example: “Short-term debt
trading at negative yields was essentially unheard of before the 2008 financial crisis. But since then, the condition
has cropped up at times of market stress, reflecting extraordinarily expansive central-bank policy and anemic
growth in much of the world. Yields on some U.S. bills traded below zero at the end of each of the past three years
amid strong demand for liquid assets, according to analysts.” Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-
bill-yield-tips-into-negative-territory-1411516748
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and the relevant data strongly suggest that those negative yields would be caused by scarcity
of liquid bond supply and so high liquidity premia, when the money holding cost is low.
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A Appendix
Proof. Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2.
First, consider Lemma 1. Substituting φtpt into the objective function in Equation 6 re-
express the bargaining problem as
max
q1t
{
u(q1t )− q
1
t
}
subject to q1t = φtpt, and pt ≤ w˜t. If φtw˜t ≥ q
∗, the optimal choice of q1t will be the first best
quantity q∗, i.e., q1t = q
∗. Then, pt = (p
m
t , p
a
t ) such that φtp
m
t +gp
a
t = q
∗. However, ifφtw˜t < q
∗, the
effective budget constraint is binding. Accordingly, the buyer will give up all her real balances
in order to purchase as many as possible. Then, the optimal choice of q1t will be the same as her
real balances φtw˜t. Also, pt = (mt, at). When it comes to Lemma 2, the same steps above can
be taken for proof. Since it is straightforward, it is omitted.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3
First, consider whether the real balances are as a direct medium of exchange or as collateral
to borrow credit enough to obtain the optimal quantity q∗ in each of the two DM markets. If
z˜t ≥ q
∗ or z˜at ≥ q
∗, q1t = q
∗ or q2t = q
∗; otherwise, q1t = z˜t or q
2
t = z˜
a
t by lemmas 1 or 2.
Then, plugging these results into the first order conditions (13) and (14) for the maximum of
the objective function will yield the equilibrium prices φt and ψt. Also, the marginal utility
function u′ is monotonically decreasing in its argument, so that the equilibrium is uniquely
determined.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 1
The quantity which buyers can consumewith their money holdings in the DM is determined
by equation (15) when the real balances are not enough to obtain q∗.
1 + µ
β
= 1 + θ [u′(φM + gA)− 1]
Then, if we plug zero into φM and solve this equation for µ, we can obtain the upper bound of
µ for the monetary equilibria as follows.
µ¯ ≡ {µ : µ = β[1 + θ[u′(gA)− 1]]} − 1
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B Impact of money growth rate on the liquidity premia of Treasuries: Quarterly Data
Variables AA CP - T-Bills TED Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1971Q2-2008Q4 1971Q2-2008Q4 1971Q2-2008Q4 1986Q1-2008Q4 1986Q1-2008Q4 1986Q1-2008Q4
NM Growth 1.144*** 1.740*** 3.116*** 3.863***
(0.170) (0.230) (0.211) (0.353)
Dept to GDP -1.742*** -0.0345 -2.940*** -0.0337
(0.418) (0.308) (0.922) (1.321)
Federal Funds Rate 0.0926*** 0.0914***
(0.0122) (0.0193)
Constant 0.587*** 1.424*** 0.0312 0.616*** 2.314*** 0.264
(0.0538) (0.236) (0.185) (0.0565) (0.539) (0.731)
Observations 151 151 151 92 92 92
Adjusted R-squared 0.005 0.209 0.422 0.184 0.329 0.201
Variables FDIC CDs - T-Bills AAA Cor. - Treasury Bond
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1998Q2-2008Q4 1998Q2-2008Q4 1998Q2-2008Q4 1946Q1-2008Q41 1966Q1-2008Q4 1966Q1-2008Q4
NM Growth 3.182*** 2.757** 3.060*** 2.353***
(0.352) (1.167) (0.999) (0.222)
Debt to GDP 1.734 4.705 -1.708*** -1.969***
(4.417) (3.789) (0.250) (0.367)
Federal Funds Rate -0.0845* -0.0235*
(0.0451) (0.0136)
Constant 0.0835 -0.938 -2.332 0.709*** 1.716*** 2.038***
(0.102) (2.558) (2.191) (0.0406) (0.135) (0.254)
Observations 43 43 43 252 172 172
Adjusted R-squared 0.218 0.207 0.159 0.064 0.320 0.276
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The depen-
dent variables are the yield spreads between private financial assets and Treasuries. They are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory
variables are the growth rate of NarrowMoney and the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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